Publication by UGent faculty: Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments

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Abstract

We study mechanism design in quasi-linear private values environments when there are two alternatives. We show that under a mild range condition, every implementable allocation rule is a generalized utility function maximizer. In unbounded domains, if we replace our range condition by an independence condition, then every implementable allocation rule is an affine maximizer. Our results extend Roberts’ affine maximizer theorem (Roberts, In: Laffont J-J (ed) The characterization of implementable choice rules, 1979) to the case of two alternatives.

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Journal/Newspaper/Magazine:Social Choice and Welfare
Publisher:Springer
Details:

Article co-authored by prof. T. Marchant (Ghent University, Belgium) and prof. D. Mishra (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India) about the axiomatic foundations of multicriteria decision aiding.


Publication Category:Academic Article
Language:English
Publication Date/Year:2014-08-14
Focus Domain:Engineering
Author Name:Thierry Marchant, Debasis Mishra
Keywords:data-analysis